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State elections in Brazil are an excellent laboratory to test the fiscal preferences of voters in new 
democracies. Brazil is a developing economy with a history of large budget deficits at the federal and state level, 
with a established democracy since the late 1980´s, mandatory vote and considerable social and economic diversity.  
In addition, in 1998 Brazil has undertaken substantial reforms increasing fiscal responsibility at the state level that 
substantially altered the incentives to run deficits. This paper uses the experience of state level elections in Brazil in 
the period from 1990 to 2002. We identify a change in politicians´ behavior in the term before the 2002 elections and 
present evidence that this change is mostly due to a series of institutional reforms that hardened budget constraints. 
Our results show that, despite the prevalence deficits, the governors did not increase their reelection prospects by 
running larger deficits. Moreover, after the fiscal reforms, fiscal deficits turn almost immediately to surpluses while 
the probability of an incumbent being reelected increased. We conclude that voters in Brazil behave much like their 
counterparts in older democracies, showing evidence of fiscal conservatism. Brazilian voters needed neither more 
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1. Introduction 
 
At least since the work of Nordhaus (1975) on political business cycles, a powerful idea 
has taken root in the political economy of fiscal policy: government incumbents can manipulate 
the economy to seek re-election and they will do that by increasing budget deficits before the 
election and pay for them after the election. Nordhaus´ model assumed myopic voters who were 
unable to anticipate future adjustment costs. Later models introduced two significant changes: 
they assumed rational voters, and limited the incumbents´ ability to manipulate economic policy, 
including fiscal policy.
1
The above motivation for running a deficit is non-partisan or opportunistic, so that, 
irrespective of the preferences of policy-makers, the incentive to run a deficit remains the same.
2 
However, when we come to testing whether deficits are larger in electoral periods, the results for 
developed countries are far from conclusive, as Alesina et al. (1997) and, more recently, Shi and 
Svensson (2002) have shown.
3 Peltzman (1992) argues that voters actually penalize growth in 
federal and state spending. Alesina et al. (1998) have shown that the correction of fiscal deficits 
has no impact on re-election probabilities or even in popularity rankings, for OECD and 
European countries respectively so that there is no evidence of electoral incentives to run a 
deficit.
4 In sum, studies for developed economies have generally failed to document the electoral 
benefit of running a pre-election deficit. 
The evidence for developing countries is more favourable on the existence and benefits of 
electoral budget cycles. Ames (1987) studies seventeen Latin American countries from 1947 to 
1982, and documents a sizable increase in expenditures the year before the election, followed by 
a concomitant decrease the year after. Block (2000) presents evidence of a political business 
cycle in fiscal policy in a cross-section of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
                                                 
1 See, among others, Rogoff and Sibert (1988). 
2 There are other reasons for running a deficit before an election, but they have a partisan character and depend on 
the preferences of policy-maker. For instance, an important reason stem from strategic motives, whereby the current 
policy-maker uses the deficit to constrain future policy-makers who might have different preferences. In this last 
case, the higher the probability of being substituted in office, the greater the incentive to run a deficit. In the case of 
“partisan deficits”, both a disagreement over the composition of public spending or over the size of government can 
result in a strong incentive to run a deficit, as first explored in Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Tabellini and Alesina 
(1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989). 
3 Other factors, such as the fragmentation of cabinets, have been shown to be important determinants of fiscal 
deficits. See Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002). 
4 We will address this topic below.   3
In a recent paper, Brender and Drazen (2005a) find evidence in favor of a political budget 
cycle in a cross-section of countries by moving ahead in the explanation and suggesting that it is 
only data on new democracies that support the existence of electoral cycles reflected in higher 
reelection prospects. In other words, the Nordhaus story comes back to life in a more subtle form: 
true, pre-election deficits may imply some non-rationality on the part of voters and it is only 
natural that this lack of “voter sophistication” occurs in new democracies and disappears as 
democratic regimes mature.
5 As the authors put it, the question of whether there is an electoral 
budget cycle becomes a question of where it exists. The model suggests that, as a country gains 
experience in electoral politics, the scope for a political fiscal cycle is diminished.
6 The 
experience of new democracies, defined as the period between the first four democratic elections, 
could also be responsible for the correlation between incomes per capita, governmental and 
electoral systems and budget deficits. In the same line, Brender (2003) shows evidence that 
voters began to reward better fiscal performances in Israeli municipal elections when they were 
able to get enough information on fiscal behavior. In other words, as they become more 
sophisticated and informed, voters will reward conservative fiscal policies. 
In this paper we carefully document the experience of state level elections in Brazil for 
the period 1990 to 2002 in order to test the degree of voters´ fiscal “conservativeness”. State 
elections in Brazil are an excellent laboratory to test the fiscal preferences of voters in new 
democracies. Brazil is a developing economy with a history of large budget deficits at the federal 
and state level, with an established democracy since the late 1980´s, mandatory vote and 
considerable social and economic diversity. Contrary to expected we do not find a positive 
impact of state deficits on reelection prospects, even after controlling for state and federal 
economic conditions and political context. Moreover, in 1998 Brazil has undertaken substantial 
reforms increasing fiscal responsibility at the state level that substantially altered the incentives to 
run deficits. We find that this institutional change led to a swift change from deficits to surpluses 
at the state level without harming incumbents reelection prospects, quite to the contrary.  
                                                 
5 Schuknecht (1996) suggests an alternative reason for conducting fiscal deficits in developing countries: in these 
countries fiscal policy is more discretionary in the sense that manipulations to favour specific groups, such as the 
distribution of subsidized goods and employment via public works, are easier to conduct. This is a “supply side” 
explanation, working through the “deficit to votes technology” available to policy-makers, whereas Brender and 
Drazen´s is a “demand side” explanation. 
6 This is in line with evidence in Veiga and Pinho (2006), which study two periods in the recent economic history of 
Portugal, in which the country could be first considered a “new democracy” and then a “mature” democracy.   4
This paper is organized in three sections, in addition to the introduction. Section 2 
presents the case for our choice of Brazilian state elections as an important case to analyse. In 
Section 3 we present and discuss the empirical evidence on fiscal cycles and re-election. The last 
section summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Brazilian States and Budget Deficits. 
 
Several reasons make Brazil a case worthy studying in depth as regards the electoral 
effects of fiscal policy. Brazil is a developing country with GDP per capita of about US$ 9000 in 
2006
7, coded as a less developed country by Brender and Drazen (2005a and 2005b). After a 
long period of authoritarian rule, Brazil has democratized in 1985 and has since experienced four 
rounds of democratic elections up to 2003, at the presidential, state gubernatorial and local levels. 
This condition clearly qualifies Brazil as a new democracy according to the criteria of four 
democratic elections established by Brender and Drazen (2005a and 2005b). Actually, Brazil is 
the fourth largest democracy in the world, after the United States, India, and Indonesia. 
First, the institutional setting is promising for research. Brazil is a Federative Republic, its 
1988 Constitution defining as major administrative divisions 26 states and a federal district 
whose governors and legislative representatives are elected every four years in a legally binding 
calendar. In 1930, Brazil was the first Latin American country to adopt universal suffrage, and 
one of the first among all over the world. 
8 Moreover, following other countries in the region, 
voting is compulsory for all elections.
 This last aspect is a continuous source of debate about 
whether mandatory voting forces “less sophisticated” to the polls, thereby reducing the 
democratic accountability, or not. Though it is hard to give precise estimates for a non-event, 
some works have shown that both absent voters,
    9 or those who declared they would not vote in a 
voluntary voting system, share no specific social, political, or economic characteristic.
10
Second, our paper studies the electoral impact of fiscal policy at the sub-national level, as 
in Brender (2003), which studies Israel’s local governments. One advantage of a sub-national 
analysis is that we can examine the choice of the deficit levels by state cabinets within the same 
                                                 
7 This value is measured in PPP. For comparison, according to the IMF Economic Outlook (2006), GDP per capita 
has value of about US$ 44000 in the USA, US$ 32000 in United Kingdom, Germany and Japan, US$ 23996 in 
Korea, and US$ 3490 in India. 
8 Ahead of other developed countries such as France, Italy, and Japan, which adopted universal suffrage only after 
the WWII 
9 Though legally compulsory, the consequences of voting abstention is limited to a monetary fine. 
10 See, for instance, Lima Jr. (1990), Power and Roberts (1995), and Elkins (2000).   5
national institutional and economic context. It is important that studies to date show that the state 
governors´ ability to manipulate fiscal policy instruments to influence voting is similar for all 
states.
11 Moreover, there is a great variation in socio-economic variables across states. In 2003 
the GDP per capita of the two richest states, Sao Paulo and the Federal District, was around US$ 
5500, similar to a country like Chile or the Czech Republic, while the two poorest states, 
Maranhão and Piauí, displayed an income of US$ 850, similar to the Cameroon or Guinea-
Bissau.
12  
Third, as we will show later, even a cursory observation of election results in Brazilian 
states will show a high level of political competition at state level so that the institutional 
environment does not provide incumbent governors with a significant electoral advantage over 
their challengers.
13
Last, but not least, since the democratization, Brazilian governmental institutions have 
been made great efforts to produce good quality data on states´ public finance. 
The fiscal performance of Brazilian states during the late 1980s and the 1990´s was very 
erratic, with frequent deficits and excessive state borrowing followed by federal bailouts.
14 These 
federal bailouts in effect “transformed” state fiscal deficits into national inflation, further fuelling 
the latter. In a high inflation environment, states were able to balance their budget deficits by 
indexing taxes, deferring outlays, and some other accounting practices that made use of inflation. 
After successive cycles of debt renegotiations in 1989 and 1993, the situation became 
unsustainable after 1994, when the Real Plan finally succeeded to control national inflation. The 
central bank intervened on several state banks, privatized quite a few and negotiated agreements 
to restructure state debts.
15 At the end of 1997 a new agreement was reached,
16 which involved a 
conditional bailout. In order to have their debt rescheduled, states were now prohibited from 
                                                 
11 See Santos (2001) with several case studies. The general conclusion is that institutional constraints on budgeting 
are similar to all states, with a greater influence from the local executive in the budgeting process vis-à-vis the 
legislative. 
12 The country figures were extracted from the World Bank Developing Indicators (2005). Not surprisingly, Brazil 
shows also one of the highest levels of individual inequality, with a national Gini index around 0.6. 
13 Electoral competition is also intense for the state assembly.  In the last three elections - 1994, 1998, and 2002 – the 
number of candidates per mandate was 7.6, 10.1, and 11.3 respectively. See the LEEX/UCAM data at the following 
internet site: http://www.ucam.edu.br/leex/Brasil/Compet/NUMECAVI.htm. 
14 Stein (1999) analyses the Brazilian case in the context of a group of Latin American countries. 
15 The rise of the federal interest rate during 1995 was one of the reasons pointed out by Bevilacqua (2002) as the 
cause for the restructuring of state debt. Without the restructuring of debt, the increasing of interest rate in the  
market grows up difficult to the states to honor their commitment (the debt service).  
16 Law number 9496 ⁄ September.   6
issuing debt through their state banks and forced to commit a share of annual receipts to repay the 
“final” federal government bailout.
17 To guarantee the fulfilment of the agreement, 
representatives of the National Treasure monitored state fiscal performance. Lest a state failed to 
accomplish its payment, the Federal government was entitled to hold transfers to this state in an 
exact same amount as the arrears. In sum, after 1997 there has been a radical change in state’s 
fiscal environment and a swift hardening of the states´ budget constraints that is extremely rare to 
observe in any country. Thus, in our period of study, we have a substantial change in institutional 
context after 1997.  
In 2000, the federal government proclaimed the “law of fiscal accountability”, 
establishing public policy rules aimed at guaranteeing responsible fiscal management at the 
federal, state and municipal levels. Its scope reached beyond the executive to all sieges of power, 
including the Legislative and the Judiciary. More than punishing public administrators and 
politicians, the law of fiscal accountability aimed at correcting the course of public 
administration, limiting any outlays over revenues. These objectives should be accomplished 
through the adoption of planning, organization, inward and outward auditing and, last but not 
least, transparency of governments’ actions.  
 
3. Voters as Fiscal Conservatives in a New Democracy 
 
  In this section, we use data on Brazilian state elections since 1990 to answer two 
questions. The first is whether there are electoral budget cycles, translated in higher budget 
deficits in election years relative to other years. The second question is whether budget deficits in 
election years translate in an electoral advantage for the incumbent governor, party or coalition. 
Evidence of Political Budget Cycles 
Elections in Brazilian states are held every four years and, as mentioned above, state 
governors had significant scope for deficit spending in the first three elections in our sample. 
State banks were used as channels of indirect monetary creation, financing state administrations 
                                                 
17 In general, after the consolidation of state debts by the federation (where state debt was swapped for federal debt 
on financial markets), subnational governments committed to pay 12 percent of current net revenues as debt service.  
If total interest exceeded this amount, the excess would be capitalized and deferred until the repayment of the 
principal. In order to assist states, the federal government negotiated a debt extension. Moreover, the Senate issued a 
resolution whereby sub-national governments with an indebtedness threshold of more than two times their current 
net revenues should adjust their indebtedness down to that level through a fifteen-year period. The adjustment should 
be made in a specific manner: 1/15 of the total maladjustment per year.
  In case states default on debt service, the 
federal government had legal ground to confiscate transfers to guarantee the payment.   7
through the issuing of notes that were later redeemed by the central bank through national money 
issue. In the run-up to the 1998 election, the restructuring of states’ debt became law, radically 
curtailing the autonomy of state banks and imposing explicit deficit limits on state 
administrations.  In Figure 1 it is evident that state finances display an electoral budget cycle up 
to the 1998 election: the deficit in election years is sizable and significantly larger than the deficit 
in off-election years. Election-year deficits are, on average, between 1.5 and 3 percentage points 
higher than the off-election fiscal deficits. In 2002, after a period of major institutional reforms 
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In Table 1 below we estimate the impact on state fiscal balances of a series of economic 
and political variables at the state and national levels. The “Election Year” variable is an 
indicator variable taking the value one in years where elections for state governors were held and 
zero otherwise. The size and significance of the coefficient associated with “Election Year” tests 
for the presence of an electoral budget cycle. We have added controls for per capita GDP at state 
level, the growth of per capita GDP, the weight of federal grants in the state budget – both its 
                                                 
18 Actually, election year surpluses are even larger than off-election year surpluses, though the difference is not 
substantial.   8
discretionary and constitutionally determined components –, the national fiscal surplus, national 
per capita GDP growth and the inflation rate at the national level. We also use political variables 
as controls, such as the fragmentation of the electoral coalition and the ideology of state 
governors, state governing coalitions and state legislatures.
19 Other variables control for the 
ideological alignment between governors, or governing coalition, and the state legislature.   
Table 1 about here 
Our results are clear-cut: during election years, state governors run larger deficits. This 
effect is substantive and statistically significant throughout: after other controls have been taken 
into account, election-year deficits are estimated to be 1.3 to 1.5 higher than their off-election 
years. From the broad set of controls, two variables stand out as statistically significant. A fiscal 
surplus at the federal level is associated with a fiscal surplus at state level, though the quantitative 
impact is small. In addition, governors that are left-leaning or that are politically aligned with the 
state legislature tend to run surpluses, the former effect being quantitatively significant. In sum, 
we uncover strong evidence in favor of electoral budget cycles in Brazilian state elections in a 
period for which Brazil could be considered a “new democracy”. 
Budget Deficits and Reelections across Brazilian States 
As discussed in the introduction, the literature that tests the link between reelection in 
sub-national governments and fiscal performance presents evidence that voters are fiscal 
conservatives.
20 Two aspects are important here: the existence of budgetary institutions that 
define limits on either deficits or debt finance, and the level of information that voters have on 
the fiscal performance of the governments. 
21    
In a well-known analysis of U.S. state elections between 1950 and 1988, Peltzman (1992) 
showed that voters in U.S. states are fiscal conservatives, as they reward parties that produce 
lower deficits. More recently, in a study on Israeli municipal elections, Brender (2003) shows 
evidence that voters became fiscal conservative after two elections (1989 and 1993). The 
assumption is that, up to 1993, voters did not have the necessary information on the responsibility 
                                                 
19 Unfortunately, we do not have data on the fragmentation of the state governing coalition. 
20 The rationale for fiscally conservative voters may stem from the costs of the increased future taxes: consumption-
smoothing voters prefer to avoid large current deficits and are likely to “punish” leaders that generate them. 
21 The question of budget constraints - soft or hard - has been emphasized in recent papers such as Qian and Roland 
(1998) and Brender (2003).   9
of the local government and would not punish or reward them.
22 Until the end of a row of 
successive “bailouts” that ended around the 1998 election, scarce information on local fiscal 
results and the small intensity of media coverage, voters did not appear to closely evaluate local 
government performance.
23 It was the rise in information levels, associated with the publication 
of yearly financial accounts and audit reports in the local newspapers, allowed voters to reward 
leaders with better fiscal results.  
 
Figure 2 
Voters as Fiscal Conservatives 
Fiscal Policy in Election Years and Reelection 
































































Coalition Not Reelected Coalition Reelected
 
                                                 
22 Brender (2003) argued that the lack of transparency due to weakness of accounting practices originated from the 
lack of reliable data. This situation left the public “in the dark with respect to who really is responsible for the 
crises.” (Brender 2003, p. 2191). 
23 According to Brender (2003, 2192) “as pointed out by State Controller, 1994, most of local authorities did not 
submit audited financial reports at all, and the reports that were submitted were delayed by several years.”   10
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In the Brazilian case, as showed in Figure 2 above, reelected parties and coalitions deliver 
lower average budget deficits than their non-reelected counterparts, and this is true in the 1990, 
1994 and 1998 state elections, before the reforms. All governors took advantage of the soft 
budget constraint and ran deficits in an environment of high inflation at the national level and 
indirect monetization of state deficits through state banks. But those states that were fiscally 
responsible, in the sense of running lower deficits, were favored by voters. The situation changed 
dramatically in the 2002 election: states transformed an average deficit of around 2.5% of state 
GDP into an average surplus around 1 percent of state GDP. The differences between the fiscal 
behavior of reelected and non-reelected governors and coalitions become less evident both ran 
surpluses on average. 
Figure 3 below compares the two “extreme” elections of 1990 and 2002. In 1990, states 
presented generalized deficits, either in the election year or during the whole term. Again, fiscal 
behavior changed completely in 2002, following the reforms that hardened budget state 
constraints, and from 1999 to 2002 states moved into surplus. In addition, an observation of 
reelection rates, measured either as the rate of reelection of the governors´ party or the 
government coalition, increased in 2002 relative to 1990. These increases were sizable: the 
governors´ party reelection rates increased from 26 percent in 1990 to 44 percent in 2002 and the 
government coalition reelection rates increased from 39 to 56 percent. In sum, the new   11
institutional context of hard budget constraints did not harm reelection probabilities in general, 
quite the contrary.  
Figure 3 
Voters as Fiscal Conservatives 
Fiscal Policy and Reelection: Comparing the 1990 and 2002 Elections 






















































Fiscal Balance Election Year Fiscal Balance Mandate Party Reelection Coalition Reelection
Fiscal Balance Election Year -3.26 0.93
Fiscal Balance Mandate -4.21 2.28
Party Reelection 0.26 0.44





Figure 4 shows that institutional reforms in 1997 to 1999 had a sizable, permanent and 
almost immediate effect on the fiscal policy of Brazilian states. Immediately after 1999, average 
deficits turn to average surpluses. Parties and coalitions that won reelection were those that made 
the most radical change from large deficits in 1999 to large surpluses in 2000 and beyond, to 
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Figure 4 
Institutional Reform, Fiscal Policy and Reelection 
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In Table 2 below we examine whether there is any evidence that voters favor governing 
coalitions that run deficits during their term in office or before the elections. Our dependent 
variable is either the reelection of the governing party or the governing coalition. We used two 
variables for states´ fiscal performance: the fiscal surplus in the election year and the   13
accumulated fiscal surplus in the term. We also have two sets of control variables; at first, we 
included only state specific controls, related to the economy and the political context. These 
include state GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, share of federal transfers in state revenues, 
a dummy for the reform period, after 1998 (the effectiveness of law in terms of fiscal result 
started in 1998) , the fragmentation of the electoral coalition, the level of inequality – measured 
by the GINI index, and the illiteracy rate.
24 In a second model, we add country level economic 
indicators such as the national fiscal surplus, GDP per capita growth, and the inflation rate.  
State income is an important control. Brender (2003) suggested that mayors believe that 
fiscal performance depends on the income of residents. Therefore, it is more difficult to satisfy 
voters in poorer localities as residents expect the same quality level of service as the richest 
localities but the community lacks the current resources to satisfy that level of quality. We use the 
share of transfers from the federal government – constitutionally determined or discretionary - on 
state revenues, to control for a “flypaper effect” on the determination of expenditures.  Income 
inequality is included since, the more unequal is state income distribution, the more dependent on 
state resources voters may be – a “median voter” type of effect as in Meltzer and Richard (1981, 
1983) - and also the higher is the share of misinformed voters in the electorate. Following 
Brender’s (2003) argument about information, different voters may have a different ability to 
interpret government fiscal behavior. Brazil is a country with a high illiteracy rate and, as voting 
is compulsory, this means that a large number of illiterate voters cast their ballot. If the 
“sophistication hypothesis” holds, we expect that, the higher the percentage of illiteracy in a state, 
the higher the re-election chances of a coalition that runs a deficit.
25
Table 2 about here 
We examine the impact of fiscal performance on reelection using a Probit estimation. In 
Table 2 we show the results according to the two indicators of reelection: the governing coalition 
and the governing party, defined by the governor’s party. The coefficient for the fiscal surplus is 
always positive, denoting that a surplus tends to increase the probability of reelection. The 
coefficient on the election year surplus tends to be not significant when more controls are added, 
but the term accumulated surplus is always significantly positive, in most cases with a 5 percent 
                                                 
24 Unfortunately, the Brazilian Central Bank has published data on state debt only after the 1994. As argued by 
Brender (2003, p. 2194), “higher debt accumulation is expected to lead to voter dissatisfaction with the mayor’s 
performance.” as it represents a future burden to taxpayers.  
25 Definitions and sources for all variables are presented in Appendix A.    14
confidence level. This is true irrespective of the use of governing party or governing coalition as 
the criteria for reelection. Even in a situation wherein budget deficits and bailouts were not 
restricted, voters rewarded politicians who showed a better fiscal performance. That is, the 
evidence points to voters as fiscal conservatives, a surprising result in times of soft budget 
constraints and federal bailouts. This seems to contradict the findings from Brender and 
Drazen(2005). According to these last authors, Brazil would be classified as a new democracy, 
implying a low level of institutional development and voter sophistication, wherein voters have 
limited access to information, and lack of political experience, to assess the consequences of 
fiscal deficits. 
As for the control variables, as discussed earlier, there is evidence that debt restructuring 
increased chances of reelection of either the governing coalition or the governing party. Though 
not significant in all models, the effects of the coefficient for the fractionalization of the 
governing coalition deserves further research. It shows a negative sign, implying that more 
fragmented coalitions have smaller chances of reelection, even when we control for the size of 
fiscal deficits.
26 As this variable represents the electoral coalition, not the governing one, the 
result suggests that the more divided is the electoral coalition, the harder it is to coordinate the 




In this paper we test the claim that voters in new democracies are less sophisticated in the 
sense that they reward deficits before elections whereas voters in developed democracies do not. 
We conduct the test by examining all elections for state governor in Brazil since it became a 
democracy in the late 1980´s. Brazil is an important case to analyze given the diverse socio-
economic structure across states and the fact that vote is mandatory in a country with high and 
varied levels of inequality and illiteracy. In addition, Brazil has experienced a fiscal reform in the 
1990´s that radically curtailed the freedom of politicians at all levels to conduct deficits.  
The data for Brazilian state elections shows that, despite a clear political budget cycle that 
increased the deficit during election years, voters respond by rewarding the state governing 
coalitions that display lower deficits or even surpluses. In addition, after state governors lost the 
                                                 
26 For a recent analysis of the relationship between government fragmentation and fiscal policy see Perotti and 
Kantopoulos (2002).   15
ability to run large deficits, the average fiscal position switched very fast from an average deficit 
of 2.5 percent of state GDP to a surplus of 1percent of state GDP. This radical change was 
accompanied by an increase in the unconditional probability of reelection. Moreover, governing 
coalitions that were successful at being reelected in the 2002 election were those that displayed 
higher deficits in the early term and conducted a larger switch to surplus by the end of the term. 
In a nutshell, all the available evidence points to voters as fiscal conservative in the young 
democracy of Brazil.  In an adverse and changing institutional environment, Brazilian voters do 
not seem to need more experience with the political system nor better information to reward 
fiscally conservative politicians.  
Moreover, as mentioned above, we identified a change in politicians’ behavior during the 
term before the 2002 elections and present evidence that this change is due to a series of 
institutional reforms that hardened the budget constraint at state level. Rather than time, which 
was supposed to enable voters to get experienced and informed, what seems to matter for 
aggregate fiscal behavior is an appropriate institutional framework that decreases the incentives 
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Appendix A. The Data 
A.1. Reelection variables 
Governing Party – a binary variable receiving the value 1 if an incumbent leader (the governator) 
transfers votes to another candidate from the same party and he/she is elected (zero otherwise). 
As the law was modified in 1997 and the leader could run to reelection, the leader can be the 
candidate on the 1998 and 2002 election.   
Governing Coalition – a binary variable receiving the value 1 if the party of incumbent leader 
(the governator) is on the same electoral coalition which elected the new governator (zero 
otherwise) 
 The data are retrieved from Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE – www.tse.gov.br) and Instituto 
Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ DATABASE – 
www.jaironicolau.iuperj.br/database/deb/port/ ) 
The Amapá, Distrito Federal, Roraima and Tocantins were not states until 1988. The Goias state 
was divided on two states after 1988: Goias and Tocantins. The Tocantins state was considered a 
new state from fiscal point.   
 
A.2. Fiscal policy variables 
Fiscal Surplus is the difference between the Primary Revenue and the Primary Expenditure 
(excluding both finance revenue and finance expenditure - services) for each state. The data from 
revenue and expenditure are taken from the National Treasury (STN - Secretaria do Tesouro 
Nacional – www.fazenda.tesouro.gov.br). This variable is presented as a percentage of state GDP 
which is also taken from IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas Aplicadas – 
www.ipeadata.gov.br ).  The National Treasury published the independent data from Amapá, 
Distrito Federal and Roraima since 1986. These states already were territory. The National 
Treasury published the data from Tocantins (division of the state Goias) only after 1990.    
Fiscal Surplus Election Year is the Fiscal Surplus variable in the election year (1990, 1994, 
1998 and 2002) 
Fiscal Surplus Term is the accumulated of the Fiscal result on the term in the office (four years 
including the election year). 
Fiscal Surplus  National  is the difference between the Primary Revenue and the Primary 
Expenditure (excluding both finance revenue and finance expenditure - services) from the federal 
(central) government. This variable is presented as a percentage of national GDP. The data from 
revenue, expenditure and GDP are taken from IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas 
Aplicadas – www.ipeadata.gov.br ).   
Federal Grants Discretionary are transfers to define by either lobbying or negotiation from 
federal government to the states in terms on the current revenue on each state. The data is taken 
from STN (Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional – www.fazenda.tesouro.gov.br).   
Federal Grants Constitutional are transfers to define by law (the distribution of resources is 
defined by Constitution). This variable is in terms on the current revenue for each state. The data 
is taken from STN (Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional – www.fazenda.tesouro.gov.br).   
 
A.3. Economic Variables 
State GDPpc is the real (base 2000 =100) per capita GDP for each state which is taken from 
IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas Aplicadas – www.ipeadata.gov.br ).   
State GDPpc growth is the rate of growth of State GDPpc variable.   18
Illiteracy: percentage of state population above of 15 years that is illiterate. The data comes from 
IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas Aplicadas – www.ipeadata.gov.br ). 
Illiteracy Term: is the average of percentage of state population above of 15 years that is 
illiterate. The data comes from IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas Aplicadas – 
www.ipeadata.gov.br ). 
GINI Index: the degree of inequality on states. The data comes from IPEA (Instituto de 
Pesquisas Economicas Aplicadas – www.ipeadata.gov.br ). 
GINI Index Term: is the average on term of degree of inequality on states. The data comes from 
IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas Aplicadas – www.ipeadata.gov.br ). 
GDPpc growth National is the rate of growth of real per capita GDP for country. The data is 
taken from IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas Aplicadas – www.ipeadata.gov.br ).   
Inflation Rate National is based on INPC (The National Consumer Price Index - IBGE) from 
IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas Aplicadas – www.ipeadata.gov.br ). 
Study Years is number of years studied from people above 25 years old (Instituto de Pesquisas 
Economicas Aplicadas – www.ipeadata.gov.br ).  
Debt Restructuring is a dummy to institutional changes (the debt restructuring law), that takes 
the value of one after 1997 and zero otherwise. 
 
A.4. Political Variables 
Election Year is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for an election year and zero 
otherwise. 
Fractionalization State Electoral Coalition: fragmentation of electoral coalition in the previous 
election year. The data of fragmentation was calculated looking the last election. Unhappy, there 
is not the annual information to this data. The ideology is a dummy variable. The source is the 
IUPERJ (www.jaironicolau.iuperj.br/database/deb/port/ ) 
 
Table: Descriptive Statistics to full sample (1987-2003) 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Governing Party  454  0.325991  0.469261  0  1 
Governing Coalition  454  0.400881  0.490618  0  1 
Fiscal Surplus  482  -0.00744  0.029747  -0.32241  0.093616 
Election Year  486  0.277778  0.448365  0  1 
State GDP pc  483  4.769378  2.603419  1.320272  14.59899 
State GDP pc growth  482  0.012872  0.079159  -0.23272  0.420937 
Federal Grants Discretionary  477  0.137955  0.134116  0.005162  0.83934 
Federal Grants Constitutional   483  0.405721  0.237589  0.004  0.998 
Fiscal Surplus National  486  0.818889  1.397894  -1.51  3.2 
GDP pc growth National  486  0.005628  0.026048  -0.06043  0.052621 
Inflation Rate National   486  5.569227  7.518851  0.024873  24.89111 
Study Years  400  5.004594   1.265953   2.18727   8.707885 
Fractionalization State Electoral Coalition  446  0.852314  0.082299  0.587  0.951 
State Governor Right  452  0.278761  0.448887  0  1 
State Governor Left  452  0.066372  0.249207  0  1 
State Governing Coalition Right  454  0.220264  0.414882  0  1 
State Governing Coalition Left  454  0.23348  0.423512  0  1 
State Legislature Right  454  0.251101  0.434125  0  1 
State Legislature Left  454  0.07489  0.263504  0  1 
Coalition and Legislature Alignment  452  0.561947  0.496698  0  1 
Governor and Legislature Alignment  270  0.140741  0.3484  0  1 
Debt Restructuring  486  0.333333  0.47189  0  1 
Illiteracy  427  18.67433  10.98103  4.152  49.447 
Gini In  427  0.577032  0.041258  0.425567  0.666481   19
Table 1 
POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES IN BRAZIL – 1987 TO 2002 (Dependent Variable: FISCAL SURPLUS) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
            
Election Year  -0.0144 **  -0.0147 **  -0.0150 **  -0.0137 **  -0.0135 **  -0.0135 ** 
  (-3.77) (-3.73)  (-3.87)  (-4.45)  (-4.30)  (-4.27) 
State GDPpc  - 0.000701  0.0005816  0.0000873  0.0000889  0.0000399 
   (1.45)  (1.25) (0.18) (0.18)  (0.08) 
State GDPpc growth  -  0.00283 -0.00902 -0.00832 -0.00557  -0.00519 
    (0.17) (-0.58) (-0.51) (-0.33)  (-0.31) 
Federal Grants Discretionary  - -0.00784  -0.00709 -0.0302 -0.0248  -0.0245 
   (-0.57)  (-0.50) (-1.46)  (-1.17)  (-1.13) 
Federal Grants Constitutional  -  -0.0022414  -0.00149 0.00182 0.00472  0.00461 
   (-0.33)  (-0.21) (0.31) (0.78)  (0.73) 
Fiscal Surplus National   -  -  0.00264 **  0.000997  0.00168 *  0.00179 * 
     (2.75)  (0.99)  (1.72)  (1.78) 
GDPpc growth National  - -  0.0164  -0.0234  -0.0413  -0.0394 
     (0.20)  (-0.43)  (-0.76)  (-0.72) 
Inflation Rate National  - -  -0.000192  -0.0000712  -0.000065  -0.000116 
     (-1.11)  (-0.42)  (-0.37)  (-0.69) 
Fractionalization State Electoral Coalition   - -  - 0.0111  0.00546  0.010974 
      (0.70)  (0.34)  (0.62) 
            
R2  0.05 0.05  0.08  0.11  0.08  0.08 
Number of Observations  482 477  477  441  441  441 
Note: Estimation by  OLS; standard errors are White-corrected for heteroskedasticity.  20 
TABLE 2 REELECTION AND FISCAL POLICY IN BRAZIL  
  Governing Coalition  Governing Party 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) (10) (11)  (12)  Independent 
Variables                    
3.40**   2.96*  2.49      2.69*  2.20  1.96        Fiscal Surplus Election Year 
(2.22) (1.76)  (1.51)       (2.17)  (1.45) (1.29)       
     2.02**    1.86**  1.71**        1.61**  1.60**  1.48**  Fiscal Surplus Term 
     (2.84) (2.32) (2.17)        (2.40)  (2.09)  (2.01) 
 0.017    0.015   0.017  0.013    0.01 0.011     0.008 0.008  State GDPpc 
 (0.55)    (0.47)   (0.56)  (0.39)    (0.32)  (0.36)    (0.27) (0.27) 
 -0.07  -0.09    0.04 -0.65    0.32  -0.5        0.44  0.21  State GDPpc growth 
 (-0.11)  (-0.92)    (0.60) (-0.65)    (0.50)  (-0.6)    (0.66)  (0.24) 
 0.037  -0.08    -0.03  -0.16     -0.28  -0.38       -0.34   -0.44  Federal Grants 
Discretionary   (0.07)  (-0.15)    (-0.08) (-0.30)    (-0.51)  (-0.65)    (-0.61)  (-0.73) 
 -0.11  -0.051    -0.12  -0.06    -0.01  0.04       -0.03  0.021  Federal Grants 
Constitutional   (-0.49)  (-0.21)    (-0.51) (-0.25)    (-0.08)  (0.18)    (-0.16)  (0.09) 
 0.23*  1.00    0.24**  1.00    0.27**       1.00      0.28**  1.00  Debt Restructuring 
 (1.89)  (1.02)    (2.03) (0.69)    (2.38)  (1.04)    (2.50)  (0.72) 
 -1.31    -1.14    -1.40*  -1.09    -1.60 **   -1.66*      -1.69**  -1.63*  Fractionalization State 
Electoral Coalition   (-  1.59)  (-1.27)    (-1.68) (-1.22)    (-2.10)  (-1.90)    (-2.18)  (-1.85) 
 0.014*  0.01    0.012  0.007    0.007    0.004       0.004   0.001  Illiteracy  
 (1.69)  (1.09)    (1.37) (0.72)    (0.92)  (0.56)    (0.56)  (0.18) 
 -0.45  2.26    -0.03  2.89    -0.041  1.67       0.42  2.20  Gini  index  
 (-0.42)  (1.00)  (-0.03)  (1.23)   (-0.04)  (0.81)   (0.41) (1.07) 
    0.06    0.07      0.042        0.04  Fiscal Surplus National  
Term       (1.47)    (1.46)      (1.01)      (1.00) 
    0.43    0.48      -0.018      0.005  GDPpc growth National 
Term      (0.88)    (0.96)      (-0.04)     (0.01) 
    0.12    0.08      0.12            0.086  Inflation Rate National 
Term      (0.99)    (0.65)      (1.00)      (0.68) 
Observations  104 103  103 104 103 103  104  103  103 104  103  103 
Log L  -67.78 -62.57  -61.02 -66.58 -61.69 -60.15  -63.82 -58.87  -58.26 -62.87  -57.83  -57.40 
Predicted P  0.40 0.40  0.39 0.40 0.40 0.39  0.32 0.30  0.30 0.31  0.30  0.30 
Note: For each independent variable we report (dF/dx), i.e., the marginal change in the probability of success for the average values of the independent 
variables. In the parentheses we report the t-statistics based on robust, heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors (Huber/White/Sandwich).  
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level. 
 